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Abstract	  Performance	  management	   has	   triumphed	   in	   a	   decades-­‐long	   battle	   for	   a	  model	   of	  reforming	  modern	  government.	  This	  paper	  offers	   the	   first	   link	  between	  models	  of	  performance	   management	   and	   types	   of	   federalism.	   Three	   existing	   types	   of	  federalism	  were	   already	   correlated	   against	   three	   types	   of	  managing	   performance.	  	  Our	  observation	  of	  a	  new	  and	  emerging	  ‘performance	  federalism’	  correlates	  with	  a	  model	   of	   managing	   performance	   –	   ‘performance	   governance’.	   	   	   This	   paper	  constitutes	  an	  improvement	  on	  previous	  academic	  efforts	  and	  will	  allow	  case	  study	  analysis	  of	  efforts	  to	  improve	  and	  reform	  public	  management	  in	  federal	  countries.	  	  
Introduction	  This	   paper	   proposes	   a	   model	   for	   analysing	   performance	   management	   initiatives	  designed	  to	  reform	  the	  delivery	  of	  government	  services	  in	  federal	  systems.	  	  Over	  the	  last	  decade	  performance	  management	  theory	  has	  developed	  in	  close	  alignment	  with	  government	   practice	   in	   a	   variety	   of	   contexts.	   	   However,	   analyses	   of	   performance	  systems	  for	  federal	  systems	  are	  yet	  to	  be	  realised.	  Early	  assessments	  focused	  on	  the	  national	   level	   of	   government	   in	   developed	   nations,	   particularly	   Australia,	   New	  Zealand,	   the	   UK	   and	   the	   US	   where	   the	   concept	   had	   been	   most	   advanced	   (Radin	  2006;	  Bouckaert	  &	  Halligan	  2008;	  Moynihan	  2008).	   	  Recent	  research	  has	  extended	  coverage	   to	   Brazil	   Spain,	   Portugal,	   Ireland	   and	   developing	   nations	   including	  Indonesia	   and	  Ghana	   (Rhodes	   et	   al,	   2012).	   	  These	   international	  perspectives	  have	  contributed	   to	  advancing	  understanding	  of	   the	   critical	   factors	  and	   suggesting	  new	  hypotheses	   that	   will	   lead	   to	   improvements	   in	   performance	   management	   in	   the	  public	  sector.	   	  To	  date,	  research	  has	   largely	  focused	  on	  performance	  measurement	  activities	   and	   their	   contribution	   to	   management	   reform	   through	   identifying	  technical	   demands	   and	   assessment	   processes	   (Radin	   2006).	   	   Theoretical	   analysis	  continues	   to	   provide	   new	   insights	   into	   the	   linkages	   between	  public	   sector	   reform	  and	  performance	  management.	   	  Current	  research	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  contributions	  of	   leadership	   and	   organisational	   culture	   to	   the	   opportunities	   and	   constraints	   on	  reforms	  based	  on	  performance	  management	  (Moynihan	  et	  al	  2012).	   	   International	  comparisons	   have	   emphasised	   the	   contribution	   of	   political,	   socio	   economic	   and	  administrative	  contextual	  factors	  to	  the	  possibilities	  of	  performance	  based	  reforms	  (Pollitt	  and	  Bouckaert	  2011).	  Still,	  no	  method	  exists	  to	  enable	  researchers	  to	  analyse	  performance	   systems	   and	   reform	   efforts	   that	   link	   all	   levels	   of	   government	   in	   a	  federal	   system.	   For	   the	   first	   time,	   this	   paper	   will	   offer	   a	   synthesis	   of	   theoretical	  frameworks	  into	  a	  comprehensive	  model	  that	  will	  enable	  analysis	  of	  performance-­‐based	  reforms	  integrating	  governments	  in	  a	  federal	  system.	  	  	  A	   universal	   definition	   of	   federalism	   remains	   a	   largely	   unresolved	   issue	   (Kincaid	  2011,	  Erk	  2010).	  	  Nevertheless	  the	  principles	  behind	  federalism	  are	  less	  contentious	  and	  are	  based	  in	  notions	  of	  ‘cohabitation,	  self-­‐rule	  and	  shared	  rule,	  and	  diversity	  in	  unity’	   (Kincaid	   2011,	   xxxiii).	   	   Federal	   systems	   generally	   feature	   two	   spheres	   of	  government,	   national	   and	   regional	   (states	   or	   provinces),	   with	  multiple	   centres	   of	  power	   operating	   in	   one	   political	   entity	   according	   to	   constitutionally	   defined	  arrangements	   for	  sharing	  powers	  so	  that,	   ideally,	  none	   is	  sovereign	  over	  the	  other	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(Kincaid	   2011;	   Galligan	   2008).	   	   In	   some	   federal	   systems	   power	   has	   been	  decentralised	   to	   local	   governments	   based	   on	   territory	   or	   linguistic	   considerations	  (Duchacek	   1971:	   Davis	   1978).	   	   Federal	   systems	   have	   endured	   largely	   due	   to	   the	  dynamism	  that	  emerges	  from	  a	  focus	  on	  sovereign	  sub	  national	  governments	  free	  to	  innovate,	   compete	   and	   experiment	   in	   policy	   formulation	   and	   service	   delivery	  (Wiltshire	  2013).	  	  How	  to	  share	  powers	  between	  the	  federal	  state	  and	  the	  federated	  entities	  varies	  greatly	  from	  one	  country	  to	  another	  (Herperger	  1991).	  	  Evolution	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  has	  been	  toward	  increased	  cooperation	  	  (Savoie,	  1999:	  Simeon	  and	  Radin,	  2010).	  	  It	  is	  the	  divided	  sovereignty	  that	  also	  provides	  the	  greatest	  challenge	  in	  making	  federal	  systems	  adaptive	  and	  open	  to	  reform.	  Citizens	  want	  governments	   to	  collaborate,	   to	  become	  “seamless”	  and	  governments	  spend	  a	  lot	  of	  time	  adjusting	  their	  programs	  with	  the	  other	  levels	  (Julien	  and	  Proulx,	  1992;	  Dobell	  and	  Bernier,	  1997).	  Two	  key	  issues	  emerge.	  First,	  there	  exists	  a	  challenge	  for	  citizens	  where	   variability	   in	   service	   and	   performance	   create	   tensions	   in	   terms	   of	  access,	   equity	   and	   service	   quality.	   Second,	   constitutionally	   sovereign	   levels	   of	  government	  complicate	  the	  possibility,	  or	  impossibility,	  of	  policy	  enforcement.	  	  	  	  In	   an	   attempt	   to	   accommodate	   the	   complexities	   created	   by	   federalism,	   this	   paper	  synthesises	   two	   of	   Bouckaert	   and	   Halligan’s	   (2008)	   theoretical	   frameworks;	  Performance	   Ideal	   Types	   and	   Depth	   of	   Performance	   measures.	   Together	   these	  frameworks	   create	   a	   comprehensive	   model	   that	   will	   enable	   analysis	   of	  performance-­‐based	   reforms	   between	   governments	   in	   a	   federal	   system	   as	  modern	  federalism	   necessitates.	   	   We	   anticipate	   the	   model	   will	   assist	   those	   seeking	   to	  describe,	   explain,	   assess	   and	   reform	   federal	   systems	   with	   the	   application	   of	  performance.	  	  Its	  future	  application	  will	  enable	  researchers	  to	  analyse	  the	  depth	  of	  performance	  implementation	  across	  the	  multiple	  levels	  of	  government	  operating	  as	  a	   federated	   nation	   state.	   It	   is	   the	   work	   of	   this	   paper	   to	   provide	   a	   dynamic	  explanation	  of	   the	   resulting	  model	   and	  how	   its	   application	   in	   future	   research	  will	  transform	  both	  federalist	  and	  performance	  literature.	  Before	  considering	  the	  depth	  of	   performance	   management,	   some	   comment	   on	   the	   span	   of	   such	   provides	   a	  necessary	  theoretical	  foundation.	  	  	  
Span	  of	  Performance	  Management	  To	  appreciate	  the	  span	  across	  which	  performance	  management	  operates,	  Bouckaert	  and	  Halligan	  (2008)	  provide	  a	  typology	  that	  details	  three	  core	  activities	  for	  effective	  performance	   systems:	   first,	   collecting	   and	   processing	   measurement	   data	   into	  information;	  second,	  incorporating	  into	  documents,	  embedding	  into	  procedures,	  and	  stakeholder	  discourses;	  and	  third,	  using	  it	  to	  improve	  decision	  making,	  results,	  and	  accountability.	  This	   logical	   sequence	  suggests	  measurement	   is	   the	  supply	  side	  and	  the	  envisaged	  use	  is	  the	  demand	  side	  for	  performance	  and	  incorporation	  assures	  the	  link	   between	   the	   two	   (Van	   Dooren	   et	   al.	   2010;	   6).	   To	   be	   of	   any	   benefit	   to	   an	  organisation,	   the	   process	   from	   measuring	   to	   learning	   and	   improvement	   must	   be	  incorporated	  into	  a	  comprehensive	  policy	  and	  management	  cycle.	  	  
Measurement	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Measuring	  performance	  involves	  the	  systematic	  collection	  of	  data	  by	  observing	  and	  registering	   performance	   related	   issues	   for	   some	   performance	   related	   purpose	  (Bouckaert	  and	  Halligan	  2008;	  26).	  The	  performance	  measurement	  process	  can	  be	  presented	  as	  an	   ideal	   type	   that	  depicts	  measurement	  as	  an	  orderly	  process	  of	   five	  distinct	   and	   chronological	   steps:	   targeting,	   indicator	   selection,	   data	   collection,	  analysis	  and	  reporting	  (Van	  Dooren	  et	  al,	  2010;	  55).	  First	  measurement	  efforts	  need	  to	  be	  targeted	  by	  deciding	  what	  needs	  to	  be	  measured.	  Questions	  such	  as	  the	  map	  or	  representation	  of	  the	  organisation,	  programme	  or	  policy	  field	  need	  to	  be	  considered	  so	  decisions	  can	  be	  made	  on	  what	  will	  be	  measured.	  Etzioni	  and	  Lehman	  argue	  the	  ‘measurement	  of	  performance	  of	  a	  public	  agency	  requires	  a	  careful	  analysis	  of	   the	  dimensions	   of	   the	   agency’	   (1967;	   9).	   Decisions	   on	   what	   needs	   to	   be	   measured,	  targeting	  and	  priorities	  of	  measurement	  efforts	  will	  in	  large	  part	  be	  determined	  by	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  performance	  information.	  The	  selection	  of	   ‘good’	   indicators	  needs	  to	  be	  determined	  by	  criteria	  that	  should	  include	  relevance,	  timeliness	  and	  feasibility.	  Data	   collection	   can	   be	   through	   internal	   or	   external	   sources,	   while	   there	   are	  advantages	   and	   disadvantages	   to	   both,	   for	   example	   cost,	   risks	   of	   gaming,	   and	  application	   restrictions,	   the	   information	   provided	   is	   a	   vital	   component	   of	   the	  measurement	  process.	  Data	  needs	  to	  be	  analysed	  to	  turn	  it	  into	  useful	  and	  relevant	  information,	  which	  can	  then	  be	  formatted	  into	  reports.	  Reports	  need	  to	  be	  designed	  for	  use	  by	   target	   groups,	   such	   as	   citizens,	   senior	  managers,	   politicians	   and	  media.	  Identifying	  who	  will	  use	   the	   information	  and	   the	  most	   relevant	   format	   for	   reports	  are	   major	   considerations	   in	   achieving	   the	   overall	   objectives	   of	   performance	  management	  (Van	  Dooren	  2010;	  54-­‐75).	  	  	  
Incorporation	  	  In	   order	   for	  measurement	   data	   to	   be	   used	   deliberate	   action	   needs	   to	   be	   taken	   to	  incorporate	  performance	  information	  into	  policy,	  financial	  and	  contract	  cycles.	  	  From	  an	  analytical	  perspective	  there	  is	  a	  hierarchy	  between	  the	  cycles.	  Policies	  set	  out	  the	  priorities,	  which	  are	  then	  translated	  into	  programs	  and	  budgets.	  Only	  then,	  does	  the	  question	  of	  which	  agency	  will	  perform	  which	  task	  arise.	  This	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  contract	  negotiations.	  The	  policy	  cycle	  should	  thus	  determine	  the	  financial	  cycle,	  which	   then	   should	   determine	   the	   contract	   cycle	   (Van	   Dooren	   2010;	   81).	   A	  foundation	   for	   incorporation	   can	   start	  with	   a	   strategic	  plan	   that	  provides	   a	   vision	  and	  a	  guide	  of	  the	  process	  and	  includes	  objectives,	  performance	  targets,	  resources,	  activities,	   outputs	   and	   outcomes.	   Monitoring	   arrangements	   like	   the	   Balanced	  Scorecard	  (BSC)	  or	  the	  International	  Organization	  for	  Standardisation	  (ISO)	  can	  be	  used	  to	  guide	  incorporation.	  Evaluation	  and	  feedback	  on	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  plan	  help	   to	   close	   the	   loop	   and	  provide	   evidence	   for	   the	  development	   of	   the	  next	  strategic	  plan.	  The	  financial	  cycle	  is	  embedded	  in	  the	  policy	  cycle	  with	  budget	  details	  authorising	   expenditures	   for	   implementation.	   The	   contract	   cycle	   is	   linked	   to	   the	  budget	   cycle	   and	   defines	   the	   agreements	   between	   the	   key	   actors	   involved	   in	   the	  delivery	   of	   government	   services.	   Contracts	   identify	   expectations,	   monitoring	   and	  evaluation	   arrangements	   to	   help	   ensure	   the	   satisfactory	   performance	   against	   the	  objectives	   of	   the	   strategic	   plan.	   By	   incorporating	   performance	   information,	   the	  capacity	   of	   organisations	   to	   control	   their	   goal	   attainment	   should	   be	   enhanced.	   In	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this	  sense,	  incorporation	  is	  almost	  literally	  a	  bridge	  between	  measurement	  and	  use	  (Van	  Dooren	  2010;	  94).	  	  	  
Use	  	  In	   terms	   of	   the	   prime	   use	   of	   performance	   information	   Behn	   argues	   the	   public	  managers’	  real	  purpose	  –	  indeed	  the	  only	  real	  purpose	  –	  is	  to	  improve	  performance	  (Behn	  2003).	  Drawing	  on	  this	  key	  purpose	  Bouckaert	  and	  Halligan	  argue	  the	  critical	  uses	  of	  performance	  information	  relate	  to	  the	  central	  purposes	  of	  learning,	  steering	  and	   control,	   and	   accountability.	   Performance	   information	   can	   be	   available	   across	  the	  organisation	  and	  used	  where	  necessary	  to	  upgrade	  systems	  to	  specific	  standards	  (single	   loop	   learning)	   and	   to	   adjust	   standards	   (double	   loop	   learning)	   or	   even	   for	  consistent	   adjustments	   to	   systems	   (Bouckaert	   and	   Halligan	   2008;	   28).	   When	  performance	  is	  used	  for	  steering	  and	  control	  purposes	  it	   is	  equated	  with	  appraisal	  and	   the	   allocation	   of	   resources.	   Performance	   becomes	   a	  management	   tool	   for	   the	  purpose	   of	   motivation	   through	   performance	   budgeting	   and	   performance	   based	  contracts	  or	  payment	   schemes.	  Benchmarking	  and	  other	   forms	  of	   comparison	   can	  also	  be	  an	  effective	  analytical	  use	  of	  performance	  data	  in	  each	  of	  these	  key	  purposes.	  Comparisons	   with	   past	   performance,	   other	   organisations	   in	   the	   sector,	   or	   with	  international	  standards	  can	  all	  contribute	  to	  the	  use	  of	  information	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  improving	  performance.	  Reporting	  of	  performance	  is	  one	  means	  of	  providing	  an	  account	   to	   internal	   and	   external	   stakeholders	   of	   current	   and	   past	   performance.	  Reporting	   requirements	   can	   be	   imposed	   on	   organisations,	   by	   political	   leaders	   or	  another	  level	  of	  government,	  in	  most	  cases	  optimal	  indicators	  focus	  reporting	  on	  the	  outcomes	   of	   policy	   initiatives.	   External	   accountability	   demands	   high	   levels	   of	  validity	   and	   reliability	   in	   the	   reported	   information.	   These	   demand	   side	  requirements	  support	  the	  learning	  objectives	  that	  should	  feed	  back	  into	  the	  ongoing	  development	  and	  supply	  side	  decisions	  on	  the	  development	  of	  the	  measures	  	  	  Bouckaert	   and	   Halligan’s	   (2008)	   span	   of	   performance	   management	   is	   a	   helpful	  construct	   to	   consider	   the	   penetration	   of	   attempts	   to	   improve	   performance.	   An	  additional	  dimension	  is	  required	  to	  facilitate	  the	  analysis	  of	  federal	  systems.	  It	  is	  for	  this	  purpose	  that	  their	  Depth	  of	  Performance	  typology	  has	  been	  repurposed	  in	  this	  paper	   to	   provide	   a	   means	   of	   correlating	   ideal	   performance	   types	   with	   federal	  systems	  of	  government.	  This	  paper	  now	  to	  turns	  to	  consider	  this	  typology	  and	  the	  resultant	   model	   that	   will	   enable	   analysis	   of	   performance-­‐based	   reforms	   between	  governments	  in	  a	  federal	  system.	  	  	  	  
Depth	  of	  Performance	  Management	  The	   use	   of	   central	   oversight	   and	   supervision	   in	   the	   administration	   of	   subnational	  programmes	  has	  become	  a	  more	  common	  feature	  of	  federal	  systems.	  The	  emphasis	  has	  been	  on	  regulatory	  compliance	  where	  laws,	  regulations	  and	  court	  decisions	  give	  the	   central	   government	   authority	   to	   determine	   the	   subnational	   role	   in	   policy	  implementation	   (Griffith	   2009).	   	   In	   most	   federal	   systems,	   there	   are	   transfers	   of	  budgets	  from	  the	  national	  to	  the	  sub-­‐national	  governments	  that	  come	  with	  varying	  levels	  of	  control.	  Central	  governments	  still	  have	  to	  report	  what	  becomes	  of	  the	  sums	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they	   send	   to	   other	   levels	   of	   governments	   and	   thus	   the	   importance	   of	  intergovernmental	   performance	  measure	   has	   increased.	   	   Political	   science	   and	   the	  policy	  sciences	  have	  largely	  focused	  on	  institutional	  configurations,	  political	  actors	  and	   pressure	   groups.	   In	   these	   fields	   the	   focus	   has	   been	   on	   intergovernmental	  relations	   and	   the	   use	   of	   networks	   for	   policy	   development	   and	   service	   delivery	  through	  partnerships.	  Sociological	  perspectives	  stress	  the	  importance	  of	  ethnic	  and	  social	   groups	   as	   a	   reflection	   of	   the	   underlying	   social	   structure	   behind	   federal	  systems	  (Erk	  2010).	  There	  appears	  to	  be	  agreement	  across	  these	  perspectives	  that	  shared	   rule	   and	   questions	   over	   centralisation	   and	   decentralisation	   provide	   fertile	  ground	  for	  conflict	  in	  reform	  processes	  (Painter,	  2001:	  Galligan	  2008:	  Radin	  2012).	  The	  management	  sciences	  also	  have	  a	  contribution	  to	  make	  to	  these	  arrangements,	  as	  performance	  is	  an	  increasingly	  common	  element	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  levels.	   In	   federal	   systems,	   performance	   has	   a	   vertical	   dimension,	   Bouckaert	   and	  Halligan	   (2008)	   refer	   to	   this	   as	   the	   ‘depth	   of	   performance’	   and	   it	   impacts	   at	   the	  micro,	  meso	   and	  macro	   levels.	   	  Micro	  performance	   is	   at	   the	   level	   of	   an	   individual	  public	   sector	   organisation	   and	   its	   interface	   with	   citizens	   or	   other	   organisations.	  	  Meso	  performance	  is	  at	  the	  level	  of	  a	  consistent	  policy	  within	  a	  country,	  involving	  a	  range	  of	  different	  organisations.	  	  Finally,	  macro	  performance	  is	  government	  or	  even	  governance	  wide,	  at	  an	  international	  level	  (Bouckaert	  and	  Halligan	  2011;	  2).	  	  	  
Micro	  performance	  	  At	   the	   ‘micro’,	   or	   organisational,	   level	   inputs,	   processes	   and	   outputs	   will	   have	  qualitative	   and	  quantitative	  dimensions	   that	   can	  be	   subject	   to	  measurement.	   	   The	  focus	   on	   output	   quality	   is	   gaining	   greater	   momentum	   in	   those	   systems	   with	  customer/citizen	   performance	   definitions.	   	   Within	   public	   sector	   organisations	  quality	  has	  been	  increasingly	  linked	  to	  the	  application	  of	  managerial	  models	  such	  as	  ISO,	  Balanced	  Score	  Card	   (BSC).	   	  Trust	   is	   a	   critical	   factor	   in	   the	   interface	  between	  individual	  organisations	  and	  citizens	  and	  other	  organisations.	  	  Trust	  will	  impact	  on	  satisfaction,	  which	  will	  be	  measured	  with	  results	   impacting	  on	  resource	  allocation	  and	  long-­‐term	  outcomes.	  	  
Meso	  performance	  	  At	   the	   ‘meso’	   level	   performance	   refers	   to	   performance	   in	   a	   policy	   field	   or	   the	  performance	  of	   governing	  a	   chain	  of	   events	  or	  networks	   (Van	  Dooren	  et	   al.	   2010:	  25).	   	   Coordination	   between	   policy	   programmes	   and	   between	   projects	   play	   as	  important	  part	  in	  the	  achievement	  of	  outcomes.	  	  Comparative	  analysis	  is	  commonly	  used	   to	   establish	   evidence	   of	   efficiency	   and	   effectiveness.	   	   Performance	   results	   in	  policy	   fields	   such	   as	   education	   and	   health,	   based	   on	   internationally	   agreed	  indicators,	   contribute	   to	   opportunities	   to	   promote	   the	   positive	   impacts	   of	   policy	  decisions.	  	  Results	  contribute	  to	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  resource	  allocation	  decisions	  and	  build	   trust/confidence	   in	   government	   decision	   making.	   	   Comparisons	   between	  jurisdictions	   can	   provide	   evidence	   for	   national	   intervention	   in	   areas	   of	   poor	  performance.	  	  	  	  
Macro	  performance	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International	   competitiveness	  makes	   it	   important	   to	   link	  micro	  and	  meso	   through	  
‘macro’	   priorities	   in	   policy	   fields.	   	   Increasingly	   the	   use	   of	   government	   wide	  indicators	   is	   being	   used	   in	   discussions	   about	   ‘macro’	   performance	   of	   a	   country	   in	  policy	   areas	   like	   education,	   health	   environment	   and	   security.	   	   ‘The	   ultimate	  ambition	  is	  to	  guarantee	  a	  functional	  level	  of	  trust	  by	  the	  citizens	  of	  an	  international	  region	  in	  all	  its	  institutions	  and	  organisations,	  but	  especially	  in	  its	  public	  institutions	  and	   organisations	   (Bouckaert	   and	   Halligan	   2011;	   242).	   Comparisons	   with	  international	  benchmarks	  require	  the	  consolidation	  and	  aggregation	  of	  performance	  across	  the	  micro	  and	  meso	  levels	  into	  a	  macro	  level.	  Moreover,	  such	  indicators	  have	  become	  a	  necessity	  for	  governments	  that	  need	  to	  get	  the	  approval	  of	  rating	  agencies	  to	   be	   able	   to	   borrow	   at	   lower	   rates	   of	   interest.	   The	   governance	   performance	  perspective	   requires	   a	   bridging	   of	   performance	   information	   between	   the	   public	  sector,	  executive	  politicians	  and	  civil	  society.	  	  	  This	   framework	   for	   considering	   the	   depth	   of	   performance	   in	   a	   given	   system	  provides	   the	   necessary	   element	   to	   broaden	   analysis	   of	   performance	  management	  from	   its	   current	   focus	  on	  a	   solitary	   level	  of	  government	   to	  considering	   the	   impact	  across	   multiple	   levels	   of	   government.	   Applying	   this	   framework	   to	   Bouckaert	   and	  Halligan’s	   (2008)	   performance	   ideal	   types	   is	   what	   enables	   their	   correlation	   to	  federal	  systems	  of	  government	  and	  it	  is	  to	  this	  the	  paper	  now	  turns.	  	  	  
Performance	  Ideal	  types	  and	  Federal	  Systems	  
	  Bouckaert	  and	  Halligan	  propose	  four	  ideal	  types	  following	  Weber’s	  approach.	  	  These	  ideal	   types	   do	   not	   exist	   in	   reality,	   but	   serve	   to	   classify	   realities,	   which	   consist	   of	  hybrid,	  mixed,	  and	  blended	  versions	  of	  the	  pure	  modelled	  stages	  (2008:	  69).	  Figure	  1	   provides	   a	   representation	   of	   progression	   through	   the	   ideal	   types.	   	   Institutional	  coverage	  includes	  the	  quality	  of	  measures	  used,	  the	  level	  of	  government	  activity	  and	  societal	   outcomes	  addressed,	   and	   the	  degree	  of	   integration	  of	  performance	  across	  agencies	  and	  social	   institutions.	  The	  process	  of	  development/learning	   includes	  the	  collection	  and	  processing	  of	  measurements,	  the	  incorporation	  of	  measurement	  into	  documents,	   procedures	   and	   policy,	   and	   the	   use	   of	   resulting	   information	   for	  accountability	  and	  system	  improvement	  (Bouckaert	  and	  Halligan	  2008;	  Rhodes	  et	  al	  2012,	  239).	  	  
Figure	  2.	  Public	  Sector	  performance	  management	  ideal	  types.	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  (Adapted	  from	  Rhodes	  et	  al	  2012).	  	  Bouckaert	  and	  Halligan	  argue	  the	  level	  of	  sophistication	  and	  integration	  of	  the	  core	  activities	   place	   individual	   systems	   along	   a	   continuum	   extending	   from	   lowest	  performance	   administration	   to	   the	   highest	   performance	   governance.	   	   ‘Each	   is	  successively	   broader	   than	   the	   previous	   one	   in	   covering	   the	   span	   and	   depth	   of	  performance’	   (Bouckaert	   and	   Halligan	   2008;	   32).	   	   A	   performance	   system	   can	  progress	   along	   the	   continuum	  by	   ‘expanding	  and	   integrating	   the	   level	   and	   type	  of	  measurements	   used	   while	   also	   improving	   the	   processes	   of	   reporting,	   feedback,	  accountability	  and	  learning’	  (Rhodes	  et	  al	  2012,	  239).	  	  	  	  











research. In addition to contributing additional cases for use in international
comparisons, these hypotheses contribute to the development of a theory of
performance management in the public sector.
2. A framework for analyzing performance management at a country level
In order to provide a consistent basis for analyzing the state of performance
management in various countries, we drew heavily on Bouckaert and Halligan’s (2008)
approach to comparative studies, supplemented by Pollitt and Bouckaert’s (2004)
study of a similar group of countries. Contributors were asked to provide an overview
of the context for performance management in the public sector in their jurisdictions
using the elements shown in Figure 1, and then to summarise the approach to
performance management using the framework shown in Figure 2. In Figure 1, we
have drawn on Pollitt and Bouckaert to describe in more detail the contextual elements
– each of which are referred to in Bouckaert and Halligan but in a much more
summarized form. In Figure 2, we represent Bouckaert and Halligan’s typology of
Figure 1.
Key elements of context
affecting performance
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Table	  1.	  Performance	  Ideals	  and	  Federal	  Systems:	  A	  Model	  	  




• Top	  down	  
• Focus	  on	  productivity	  &	  technical	  efficiency	  
• Quantitative	  measurement	  
• principle	  measurement	  technique	  to	  be	  cost	  accounting.	  
• Exemplary	  record	  keeping	  	  
• Chain	  of	  command	  style	  of	  budgeting	  	  
• Linear	  payments	  	  
• Concern	  for	  due	  process,	  	  
• More	  input-­‐	  and	  process-­‐oriented	  than	  output-­‐effect-­‐focused	  
• Typically	  sectoral	  with	  little	  cross-­‐agency	  information	  sharing	  or	  learning.	  
• Due	  processes	  are	  the	  	  essence	  performance	  	  
• Top	  Down	  budgetary	  process	  
• Vertical	  Fiscal	  Imbalance	  
• VFI	  partially	  mitigated	  by	  transfer	  payments	  or	  Intergovernmental	  grants	  	  





Managements	   of	  
Performances	  
• Input/Process	  focus	  
• Limited	  Connectedness	  
• Qualitative	  focus	  
• Limited	   use	   of	  performance	  info.	  
• Management	  systems	  
• Sectoral	  emphasis	  
• Limited	  reporting	  
• Disconnected	  incorporation	  	  
• Incoherent	  use	  of	  performance	  information	  	  	  
• Constitutionally	  constrained	  
• Hierarchical	  
• Fragmented	  
• Activity/process	  focus	  
• Disconnected	  
• Competitive	  Federalism	  
Performance	  
Management	  
• Coherent	  	  
• Comprehensive	  
• Consistent	  
• Single	   Loop	  Reporting/limited	  double	  loop	  
• Half	  Open	  




• Limited	  Incorporation	  
• Econ	  Focus	  
• Public	   Reporting	  on	  Limited	  Range	  of	  Indicators	  
• Fragmented	  
• Output	  focus	  
• Partnership	  focus	  (Coordination,	  Harmonisation,	  Joint	  Agreement)	  
• Managerial	  
• Limited	  Evaluation	  




• Innovative	   Service	  Delivery	  
• Double	   Loop	  Reporting	  
• Tolerance	   of	  Variance	  
• Participatory	  
• Partnerships	  	  
• Perceived	  Meaningful	  Procedural	  Fairness	  	  	  
• Network	  Governance	  
• H/V	  Collaboration	  
• Chain	   Process	  (dynamic)	  




• Outcome	  Focus	  
• Government-­‐wide	  Indicators	  
• Critical	  Evaluation	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A	  model	  explained	  The	  above	  model	  requires	  some	  explanation.	  The	  following	  section	  will	  detail	  each	  ideal	   type.	  Explaining	  how	  such	   functions	  along	  Bouckaert	  and	  Halligan’s	  depth	  of	  performance	  framework	  will	  reveal	  how	  each	  relates	  to	  its	  corresponding	  model	  of	  federalism.	  	  
Performance	  Administration	  in	  Constitutional/	  Fiscal	  Federalism	  Performance	  administration	  is	  distinguished	  in	  measurement	  by	   limits	  to	  the	  span	  and	  depth	  by	  design	  that	  is	  ad	  hoc;	  incorporation	  is	  disconnected	  and	  variable;	  and	  there	  is	  limited	  use	  of	  performance	  information.	  Bouckaert	  and	  Halligan	  consider	  its	  measurement	   system	   static	   and	   micro	   organization-­‐based.	   It	   is	   a	   causal,	   linear	  input/output-­‐based	  type	  of	  measurement	  system	  that	  has	  an	   interest	   in	  effect,	  but	  that	   these	   are	   not	   fully	   pursued	   because	   of	   a	   recognized	   measurement	   problem.	  There	   is	  systematic	  administration	  of	   registered	  data	  mostly	  on	   input	  and	  process	  issues.	   	  A	  Performance	  Administration	  has	  a	  scientific	  management	   identity	  with	  a	  causal,	  mechanistic	  and	  closed	  chain	  of	  command	  and	  a	   linear	   input/output-­‐based	  type	   of	   measurement	   system.	   Its	   main	   focus	   is	   on	   technical	   efficiency.	   What	  measurement	   there	   is	   constitutes	  a	  dispersed	  and	  ad-­‐hoc	  pattern	  of	  performance-­‐related	   activities.	   There	   is	   a	   limited	   level	   of	   incorporation	   that	   is	   formal	   and	  procedural,	  but	  which	  is	  not	  necessarily	  at	  the	  core	  of	  decision	  making.	  	  Data	  is	  only	  partly	   incorporated	   and	   used	   for	   improvement	   purposes.	   The	   essence	   of	   the	  measurement	   type	   is	   static	   and	   use	   based	   on	   a	   single	   loop	   process	   of	   learning;	   a	  ‘best’	  static	  practice	  that	  can	  be	  scientifically	  identified	  will	  result	  in	  ‘standards’	  The	  learning	   cycle	   consists	   solely	   of	   reaching	   these	   (ether	   efficiency	   or	   productivity)	  standards.	  Its	  only	  ambition	  is	  to	  reach	  the	  standards	  of	  the	  operating	  procedures.	  	  	  Most	   definitely,	   depth	   of	   performance	   is	   micro	   based.	   A	   top-­‐down	   hierarchy,	  measuring	  and	   incorporating	  performance	  does	  not	  happen	  because	  organisations	  need	   it	   for	  policy	  making	  but	  because	   there	   are	   laws	   and	   regulations	   requiring	   it.	  The	   focus	   on	   productivity	   &	   technical	   efficiency	   is	   such	   that	   submitting	   a	   form,	  according	   to	   the	   requirements,	   and	   following	   the	   format	   become	  more	   important	  than	   the	   content	   itself.	   Performance	   indicators	   tend	   to	   be	   quantitative	   not	  qualitative	  and	  measurement	   is	  based	  on	  results	  since	  there	   is	  no	  separate	  quality	  focus	   as	   it	   is	   considered	   as	   constant.	   If	   there	   is	   a	   systematic	   focus	   it	   is	   still	  determined	  by	  a	  selective	  perception,	  and	  therefore	  partly	  adhoc,	  with	  clear	  service-­‐based	  measures	  and	  standard	  models	  for	  administration.	   	  Showing	  here	  its	  affinity	  with	   fiscal	   federalism,	   performance	   administrations	   consider	   the	   principle	  measurement	   technique	   to	   be	   cost	   accounting.	   	   One	   example	   is	   the	   Australian	  Government’s	  commitment	  to	  the	  use	  of	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  (CBA)	  to	  validate	  their	  controversial	   National	   Broadband	   Network	   (NBN).	   	   The	   Department	   of	  Communications	  (2014)	  argued:	   ‘The	  Cost-­‐Benefit	  Analysis	  confirms	  that	  there	  are	  real	   economic	   and	   social	   advantages	   [and	   the	   NBN]	   provides	   net	   benefits	   of	   $18	  billion	  to	  the	  community	  and	  the	  economy’.	  	  	  At	   the	   Meso	   level,	   there	   is	   limited	   reporting	   as	   Performance	   Administrations	   are	  rather	   low	   on	   a	   results	   focus	   (as	   effects	   and	   outcomes).	   Still,	   exemplary	   record	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keeping	  is	  used	  to	  defining	  work	  volumes,	  outputs,	  outcomes,	  social	  indicators	  and	  needs.	   These	   records	   were	   then	   used	   for	   reporting	   in	   order	   to	   strengthen	   the	  position	   of	   citizens,	   and	   for	   budgets	   and	   productivity	   improvement	   in	   order	   to	  strengthen	  the	  position	  of	  administrators.	  This	  is	  the	  same	  chain	  of	  command	  style	  of	  budgeting	  that	  typifies	  fiscal	  federalism.	  Indeed,	  linear	  payments	  denote	  the	  main	  interaction	  between	  the	  Meso	  and	  Macro	   levels	  of	  performance	  administrations	  as	  well	  as	  fiscal	  federations.	  Fiscal	  federalism	  lays	  out	  a	  normative	  framework	  for	  the	  assignment	  of	  functions	  to	  different	  levels	  of	  government	  and	  the	  appropriate	  fiscal	  instruments	   for	   carrying	   out	   these	   functions	   (Oates	   1999).	   	   Also	   typical	   of	   fiscal	  federalism,	   Performance	   Administration	   demonstrates	   a	   concern	   for	   due	   process,	  which	  becomes	  the	  essence	  of	  performance	  in	  this	  system,	  leads	  to	  a	  systematic	  and	  law-­‐based	   selective	   perception	   that	   is	   more	   input-­‐	   and	   process-­‐oriented	   than	  output-­‐effect-­‐focused.	   Moreover,	   ‘Performance	   measurement	   practices	   vary	   from	  one	   agency	   to	   another.	   The	   focus	   of	   the	  measurement	   is	   different	   and	   the	   quality	  uneven’	   (OECD	   1997a:	   69).	   In	   this	   way,	   Performance	   Administration	   is	   typically	  sectoral	   with	   little	   cross-­‐agency	   information	   sharing	   or	   learning.	   Hammerschmid,	  Van	  de	  Walle	   and	  Stimac’s	   (2013:	  264)	   research	   confirms	   this	   reality.	  They	   found	  that	   in	   France	   and	   Germany,	   countries	   identified	   as	   operating	   a	   Performance	  Administration	   (Bouckaert	   and	   Halligan	   2008),	   self-­‐reported	   performance	  information	   was	   significantly	   and	   consistently	   lower,	   especially	   so	   when	   the	  information	  was	  considered	  for	  external	  use.	  	  On	   a	   Macro	   level,	   just	   as	   for	   fiscal	   federalism,	   administrating	   organisations	   in	   a	  Performance	   Administration	   is	   based	   on	   the	   importance	   of	   rules,	   regulations	   and	  laws,	  mostly	  within	  a	   legal	   framework.	   	  All	  effort	   is	  geared	  towards	   increasing	  the	  capacity	   of	   a	   hierarchical	   authority	   to	   respect	   due	   processes,	   which	   become	   the	  essence	  of	  the	  system’s	  performance.	  Budget	  focus	  is	  also	  top	  down	  with	  the	  central	  government	   responsible	   for	   macroeconomics	   in	   both	   fiscal	   federalism	   and	  performance	   administration.	   Vertical	   Fiscal	   Imbalance	   is	   a	   permanent	   feature	   in	  both	  fiscal	  federalism	  and	  Performance	  Administration,	  mitigated	  to	  some	  extent	  by	  transfer	   payments	   or	   Intergovernmental	   grants	   from	   the	   central	   (Macro)	   to	   state	  governments	   (Meso).	   	   These	   grants	   play	   a	   major	   role	   in	   the	   fiscal	   systems	   of	  Australia,	  Canada,	  and	  Germany	  which	  provide	  substantial	  transfers	  of	  income	  from	  wealthy	   provinces	   or	   states	   to	   poorer	   ones	   (Oates	   1999).	   Canadian	   equalisation	  payments	  are	  unconditional,	  with	  provinces	  entitled	  to	  spend	  the	  funds	  according	  to	  their	   own	   priorities	   (Department	   of	   Finance	   2011).	   Australia’s	   system	   of	   fiscal	  equalisation	   includes	   both	   untied	   grants	   (distribution	   from	   a	   Goods	   and	   Services	  Tax)	  and	  specific	  purpose	  payments	  where	  states	  are	  required	  to	  spend	  the	  funds	  in	  a	  specific	  sector	  (COAG	  2011).	  	  There	  are	  three	  components	  of	  German	  equalisation:	  revenue-­‐sharing	   of	   the	   Value	   Added	   Tax	   (VAT);	   Länderfinanzausgleich	   (LFA)	   or	  horizontal	   fiscal	   equalisation;	   and	   Bundesergänzungszuweisungen	   (BEZ)	  (Commission	   on	   Fiscal	   Imbalance	   2001).	   In	   addition,	   the	   federal	   government	   and	  the	  Länder	  have	  developed	  a	  number	  of	  specific	  shared-­‐cost	  programs	  to	   improve	  higher	   education	   and	   regional	   economic	   structures,	   to	   support	   agriculture	  infrastructure	  and	  to	  preserve	  the	  shoreline	  (Commission	  on	  Fiscal	  Imbalance	  2001:	  11).	   Ultimately	   though,	   despite	   providing	   the	   majority	   of	   front-­‐line	   services,	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subnational	  governments	  do	  not	  have	  the	  population	  stability	  nor	  monetary	  means	  to	   influence	  policy	  on	  that	   level.	  Top	  down	  and	  hierarchical,	  both	   fiscal	   federalism	  and	  Performance	  administration	  are	  denoted	  by	  a	  strong	  administrative	  authority	  at	  the	  Macro	   level.	   In	  sum,	  Performance	  Administration	   is	  characterized	  by	  a	  span	  of	  performance	  that	  is	  narrow	  in	  focus	  and	  depth	  of	  performance	  that	  is	  micro-­‐based.	  	  	  
Managements	  of	  Performances	  in	  Competitive	  Federalism	  	  In	  this	  ideal	  type	  measurement	  is	  more	  systematic,	  broader	  in	  span,	  and	  deeper	  than	  in	   Performance	   Administration.	   	   A	   key	   element	   in	   the	   Measurements	   of	  Performances	   is	   the	  attention	  by	  governments	   to	  quality	  by	  emphasising	   the	  need	  for	   technically	   sound	   and	   functional	   performance	   systems.	   	   The	   Management	   of	  Performances	   has	   an	   affinity	  with	   federal	   systems	   based	   on	   competitive	   relations	  between	   jurisdictions;	   the	   most	   notable	   example	   is	   Canada	   but	   also	   some	   policy	  areas	  in	  the	  US.	  	  For	  Bouckaert	  and	  Halligan	  the	  Managements	  of	  Performances	  is	  an	  advance	   on	   Performance	   Administration	   in	   terms	   of	   measurement	   being	   highly	  visible,	   however	   incorporation	   and	   use	   remain	   limited.	   	   This	   ideal	   type	   applies	  specialised	  measurement	  systems	  based	  around	  management	  functions.	   	  The	  focus	  is	   on	   improvement	   and	   producing	   useful	   knowledge.	   	   There	   is	   concern	   with	  technically	   sound	  measures	   based	  within	   systems	   that	   can	   influence	   behaviour	   to	  reduce	   the	   dysfunctions	   within	   organisations.	   	   Incorporation	   of	   performance	   is	  limited	  to	  specific	  management	  functions	  such	  as	  production,	  finance,	  personnel	  and	  communications.	   	   As	   a	   consequence	   there	   is	   disconnectedness	   and	   some	  incoherence	  in	  the	  use	  of	  information.	  	  The	  focus	  on	  tasks,	  activities	  and	  processes	  is	  important	   in	   the	   Managements	   of	   Performances	   because	   the	   ultimate	   purpose	   of	  measurement	   is	   the	   production	   of	   knowledge	   for	   the	   improvement	   in	   the	  input/output	  relation	  (Bouckaert	  and	  Halligan	  2008;	  79).	  	  	  Managements	   of	   Performances	   encourages	   the	   introduction	   of	   best	   practice	  comparisons	   that	   typifies	   competitive	   federalism.	   	   At	   the	  meso	   level	   jurisdictions	  seek	  to	  promote	  improvements	  in	  input	  and	  outputs	  within	  specific	  policy	  areas	  that	  may	  be	   subject	   to	  national	   or	   international	   comparison.	   	   For	   example	   subnational	  governments	  in	  the	  US	  and	  Canada	  take	  a	  strong	  interest	  in	  policy	  areas	  where	  there	  is	   potential	   economic	   advantage.	   	   In	   the	   US	   ‘states	   are	   often	   found	   taking	   early	  action	   to	   gain	   a	   competitive	   advantage	   over	   their	   neighbors,	   most	   commonly	  through	   attempts	   to	   accelerate	   or	   diversify	   economic	   development’	   (Rabe	   2011;	  496).	   	   In	   the	   Managements	   of	   Performances	   quality	   is	   linked	   to	   competition	   so	  performance	  data	  accommodates	  quality	  as	  well	   as	  quantity.	   	   In	  keeping	  with	   this	  ideal	   type	   measurement	   remains	   critical	   in	   tangible	   policy	   areas	   such	   as	  infrastructure	  development.	  However	  there	  is	  also	  emphasis	  on	  more	  difficult	  areas	  to	  measure	   such	   as	   policies	   in	   education,	   health	   and	   child	   care	   services	   that	   offer	  competitive	   advantage	   to	   attract	   business	   and	   citizens.	   	   Also	   representative	   of	  competitive	   federalism	   in	   the	  Measurements	   of	   Performances	   is	   the	   focus	   on	   the	  design	   of	  measurement	   systems	   to	   demonstrate	   improvement.	   	   Competition	  with	  and	  ranking	  against	  other	   jurisdictions	   in	  key	  policy	  areas	  can	  become	  a	  driver	  of	  improvement	   in	   the	   federal	  context	   in	   targeted	  policy	  areas.	   	  The	  Measurement	  of	  Performances	   allows	   for	   the	   provision	   of	   performance	   based	   answers	   in	   key	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questions	   in	   a	   competitive	   environment.	   	   A	   representative	   example	   is	   Alberta’s	  Economic	   Dashboard,	   which	   provides	   comparative	   data	   against	   other	   provinces	  including	  details	  of	  economic	  growth	  rates,	  building	  permits,	   job	  vacancies,	   retails	  sales,	  and	  GDP.	  	  	  At	   the	  micro	   level	  Managements	   of	   Performances	   supports	   serious	   efforts	   to	   link	  performance	  information	  to	  different	  management	  functions.	   	  Information	  tends	  to	  be	   incorporated	   within	   but	   not	   necessarily	   between	   these	   functions.	   	   This	   suits	  governments	  in	  competitive	  federal	  systems	  as	  measures	  are	  defined	  by	  validity	  and	  reliability,	   as	   the	   assumption	   is	   that	   measurement	   influences	   individual	   and	  organisational	   behaviour.	   	   Greater	   focus	   on	   quality	   measures	   leads	   to	   systematic	  methodologies	  for	  designing	  and	  implementing	  measurement	  systems.	  	  For	  example	  the	  open	  government	  initiative	  in	  British	  Columbia	  is	  a	  single	  loop	  learning	  process	  that	  requires	  individual	  agencies	  to	  use	  data	  to	  ‘inform	  policy	  decisions	  and	  improve	  government	   services’	   (BC	   2015).	   	   Despite	   the	   introduction	   of	   such	   initiatives	  incorporation	   is	  disconnected,	  as	  performance	   tends	   to	   focus	  on	  specific	   functions	  rather	  than	  linking	  across	  them.	   	  As	  a	  result	  the	  use	  of	  performance	  information	  is	  limited	  and	  sub-­‐optimal	  because	  of	  the	  disconnected	  dynamics	  established	  between	  different	  management	   systems.	   	  This	   limits	  policy	   learning	  even	   if	   there	   is	  double	  loop	  potential	  (Bouckaert	  and	  Halligan	  2008;	  97).	  	  One	  example	  is	  highlighted	  by	  the	  Ontario	  Auditor	  General’s	  review	  of	  renewable	  energy	  initiatives	  by	  the	  Department	  of	   Energy.	   	   Despite	   the	   existence	   of	   relevant	   legislation,	   the	   development	   of	   an	  energy	  plan	  and	  the	  availability	  of	  comprehensive	  data	  on	  the	  electricity	  system,	  the	  Department	   did	   not	   undertake	   comprehensive	   assessments	   of	   the	   long	   term	  economic	   and	   environmental	   impact	   the	   billion	   dollar	   investment	   to	   increase	  renewable	  energy	  into	  the	  electricity	  system	  (OAGO	  2011;	  89).	  	  	  	  	  At	  the	  macro	  level	  an	  operative	  secession	  threat	  constrains	  central	  governments	  in	  competitive	   federal	   systems	   to	   be	   roughly	   held	   to	   assigned	   constitutional	   limits.	  	  The	  subnational	  governments	  are	  left	  largely	  to	  compete	  among	  themselves	  in	  their	  capacities	  to	  meet	  the	  demands	  of	  citizens	  for	  collectively	  provided	  services.	  	  Central	  governments	   in	   competitive	   federal	   systems	  may	   be	   constitutionally	   restricted	   in	  their	  domain	  of	  action;	  within	  its	  assigned	  sphere	  it	  is	  sufficiently	  strong	  to	  enforce	  economic	  freedom	  or	  openness	  over	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  territory.	  	  Among	  federations	  Canada	  has	  the	  most	  detailed	  list	  of	  constitutional	  powers	  held	  by	  the	  provincial	  and	  federal	   governments	   respectively	   (Bakvis	   and	   Brown	   2010;	   487).	   	   By	   way	   of	  comparison	  Canadian	  provinces	  exercise	  jurisdictional	  autonomy	  while	  the	  German	  states	  are	  more	  dependent	  on	  the	  centre	  (ibid;	  487).	  	  Canadian	  provinces	  are	  jealous	  of	   their	   jurisdiction	   and	   autonomy,	   both	   singly	   and	   in	   unison	   resisting	   federal	  intrusion	   (Simeon	   and	   Radin	   2010;	   360).	   	   In	   competitive	   federal	   systems	   service	  delivery	   agreements	   between	   the	   levels	   will	   be	   function/programme	   based	   and	  largely	   disconnected.	   	   As	   a	   result	   there	   is	   a	   fragmented	   approach	   to	   policy	   with	  limitations	   on	   the	   development	   of	   comprehensive	   national	   approaches.	   	   Just	   as	  Managements	  of	  Performances	  is	  process	  based	  and	  focuses	  on	  improvements	  in	  the	  relationship	   between	   input/output,	   the	   fragmentation	   in	   a	   competitive	   federal	  system	  constrains	  opportunities	  to	  focus	  on	  outcomes	  in	  national	  issues.	  	  As	  a	  result	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of	  constitutional	  restrictions	  federal	  approaches	  tend	  to	  be	  voluntary,	  policy	  activity	  focused	  and	  disconnected.	  	  	  	  
Performance	  Management	  in	  Collaborative	  Federalism	  	  The	   Performance	   Management	   ideal	   type	   has	   a	   technically	   sound,	   functional	   and	  legitimate	  performance	  measurement	  system.	  	  When	  compared	  with	  Managements	  of	  Performances	  there	  is	  a	  functional	  and	  hierarchical	  integration	  of	  measurement,	  incorporation	   and	  use.	   	   Performance	   information	   is	   systematically	   and	   coherently	  generated,	   integrated	   and	   used.	   	  Measurement	   systems	   are	   technically	   sound	   and	  functional,	   but	   also	   legitimate.	   	   The	   process	   of	   incorporation	   of	   performance	  information	   relies	   on	   quality	   models,	   and	   takes	   into	   account	   the	   need	   to	   match	  supply	   with	   demand.	   Use	   of	   performance	   information	   includes	   a	   systematic	  comparison	   of	   results,	   a	   coherent	   vision	   of	   learning	   and	   to	   improve,	   and	   an	  externally	   oriented	   strategy	   of	   change.	   Bouckaert	   and	   Halligan	   propose	  Performance	   Management	   as	   an	   ideal	   type	   that	   shifts	   from	   management	   of	  performance	   to	  management	   for	   performance.	   	  The	   improvement	  on	  Performance	  Administration	  and	  Managements	  of	  Performances	   is	  a	  broadening	  of	   the	  scope	  of	  measurement	   and	   a	   deepening	   of	   management	   efforts.	   	   Models	   such	   as	   the	  Australian	   Performance	   Measurement	   and	   Reporting	   Framework	   (ANAO	   2013)	  define	  quality	  as	  an	  integrating	  policy	  based	  on	  measures	  and	  indicators	  focusing	  on	  results.	   	   Ultimately	   this	   results	   in	   performance	   based	   organisations	   where	  management	  functions	  are	  connected.	  	  Contracts	  are	  a	  key	  element	  of	  performance	  and	  suit	  the	  joint	  service	  delivery	  arrangements	  necessary	  in	  a	  federal	  system	  based	  on	   collaboration	   between	   governments.	   	   The	   contractual	   agreements	   under	   the	  Australian	   Intergovernmental	   Agreements	   reflect	   such	   service	   delivery	  arrangements.	   	   The	   participation	   across	   the	   levels	   is	   important	   to	   Performance	  Management;	   communication	   and	   integration	   with	   strategic	   planning	   and	   agency	  management	  being	  essential	  ingredients	  in	  joint	  agreements.	  	  	  	  At	  the	  macro	  level	  in	  collaborative	  federal	  systems	  national	  goals	  are	  achieved,	  not	  by	   the	   federal	  government	  acting	  alone	  but	   in	   conjunction	  with	   some	  or	  all	  of	   the	  subnational	  governments	  acting	  collectively.	   	  Performance	  Management	  provides	  a	  solid	   basis	   for	   collaborative	   action	   as	   measures	   need	   to	   be	   developed	   that	   are	  acceptable	   to	   a	   range	   of	   internal	   and	   external	   stakeholders.	   	   In	   collaborative	  arrangements	   the	   political	   executive	   exchange	   information,	   discuss	   policy	  formulation	  and	  coordination	  and	  establish	  protocols	  and	  regulatory	  frameworks	  in	  individual	   policy	   areas.	   	   These	   arrangements	   remain	   fragmented	  however	   as	   they	  focus	   on	   specific	   policy	   areas	   and	   issues	   rather	   than	   a	   comprehensive	   approach.	  	  Performance	   Management	   can	   add	   legitimacy	   to	   joint	   arrangements,	   as	   there	   is	  interaction	   between	   top	   down	   and	   bottom	   up	   approaches.	   	   At	   the	   macro	   level	  intergovernmental	  agreements	  formalise	  arrangements	  between	  the	  parties	  and	  set	  out	   the	   objectives,	   duration	   and	   procedures	   on	   the	   agreed	   course	   of	   action	  (Saunders	   2002).	   The	   political	   executive	   relies	   on	   information	   and	   feedback	   from	  the	   subnational	   level	   that	   attests	   to	   the	   success	   or	   otherwise	   of	   policy	   initiatives.	  	  Performance	   Management	   supports	   an	   external	   openness	   of	   sharing	   information	  with	   citizens,	   customers	   and	   interest	   groups	  helping	   to	   raise	   levels	   of	   satisfaction	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and	  trust	  in	  collaborative	  arrangements.	  	  The	  application	  of	  PISA	  testing	  and	  scoring	  frameworks	   across	   federal	   systems	   such	   Belgium,	   Canada,	   Germany,	   Switzerland	  and	  Australia	   is	   promoted	   as	   a	  measurement	   tool	   to	   influence	  parents	   confidence	  and	  support	   for	  education	  policies	  having	  a	  positive	   impact	  on	  student	  and	  school	  performance.	   	   In	  2012	   the	  OECD	  reported	  on	   the	   strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  US	  students	   based	   on	   their	   PISA	   results	   in	   comparison	   with	   other	   countries.	  	  Measurement	  data	  was	  used	  to	  provide	  advice	  to	  US	  governments	  on	  what	  could	  be	  done	  to	  help	  improve	  student	  performance	  (OECD	  2013).	  	  	  At	   the	   meso	   level	   collaboration	   involves	   both	   collective	   action	   to	   address	   policy	  issues	   that	   cross	   state	   borders	   and	   subnational	   participation	   in	   negotiations	   of	  where	  their	  interests	  will	  be	  particularly	  affected.	   	  In	  collaborative	  federal	  systems	  ‘harmonisation’	   refers	   to	   joint	   agreement	   that	  national	   and	  subnational	   legislation	  and	  policy	  commitments	  do	  not	  contradict.	  	  This	  has	  implications	  at	  the	  meso	  level	  where	  subnational	  government	  have	  agreed	  to	  comply	  with	  national	  objectives	  and	  policy	   commitments.	   	  With	   Performance	  Management	   there	   is	   an	   explicit	   concern	  with	  matching	  supply	  and	  demand	  for	  performance	   information	  between	  different	  stakeholders.	  	  There	  is	  an	  emphasis	  on	  concern	  with	  programme	  effectiveness	  that	  involves	  linkages	  between	  the	  meso	  and	  the	  micro	  level.	  	  Incorporated	  information	  should	   be	   used	   in	   a	   systematic	   way,	   including	   benchmarking,	   for	   comparisons	  where	   the	   ultimate	   purpose	   is	   management	   for	   improved	   performance	   toward	  agreed	  outcomes.	  	  If	  the	  objective	  of	  collaboration	  is	  the	  improvement	  of	  long-­‐term	  outcomes	   is	   specific	   policy	   areas	   then	   performance	   management	   promotes	  integration	   of	   management	   and	   policy	   cycles	   with	   financial	   and	   contract	   cycles.	  	  While	   the	   aim	   of	   this	   integration	   is	   improvement	   the	   focus	   on	   performance	   can	  produce	  potential	  dysfunctions,	  even	  perverse	  pathologies,	  which	  work	  against	  the	  original	  policy	  objectives.	   	  The	  comparative	  use	  of	  information	  through	  managerial	  practices	   like	   the	  production	  of	   league	   tables	   to	   determine	   resource	   allocation,	   or	  incentives	  and	  sanctions,	  in	  subnational	  education	  systems	  in	  the	  US,	  Australia	  and	  Canada	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  sometimes	  produce	  gaming	  behaviour.	  For	  example	  the	  manipulation	  of	  test	  scores	  in	  some	  US	  schools	  under	  the	  assessment	  regimes	  in	  the	  Race	  to	  the	  Top	  programme	  introduced	  by	  the	  Obama	  Administration,	  that	  worked	  against	  the	  aims	  of	  service	  delivery	  objectives.	  	  	  	  Performance	  Management	  encourages	  bottom	  up	   involvement	   in	   the	  development	  of	  performance	  measures.	  	  Bouckaert	  and	  Halligan	  argue	  this	  promotes	  commitment	  and	  legitimacy	  by	  individuals	  and	  organisations	  to	  the	  measurement	  system.	   	  Such	  commitment	   is	   critical	   at	   the	  micro	   level	   in	   collaborative	   arrangements	   in	   federal	  systems	  where	   line	  agencies	   implement	  service	  delivery	  agreements.	   	  Appropriate	  management	  models	  under	  this	  ideal	  type	  define	  quality	  as	  an	  integrating	  approach	  based	  on	  measures	  and	  indicators	  focusing	  on	  results.	  	  Performance	  measurement	  is	  crucial	   for	   detecting	   problems	   and	   predicting	   individual	   and	   organisational	  behaviour.	   	   There	   is	   single	   and	   some	   limited	   double	   loop	   learning	   as	   central	  agencies	   and	   auditors	   review	   performance	   against	   contractual	   obligations.	   	   In	  service	   delivery	   arrangements	   performance	   management	   emphasises	   the	  importance	  of	  quality	  as	  an	  improvement	  policy	  based	  on	  measures	  and	  indicators	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focusing	   on	   results.	   	   At	   the	   micro	   level	   collaborative	   arrangements	   between	  governments	   will	   help	   to	   establish	   coherent	   and	   consistent	   approaches	   across	  jurisdictions.	   	   Collaborative	   approaches	   raise	   the	   expectations	   of	   the	   political	  executive	   for	  more	  comprehensive	  service	  delivery.	   	  Bouckaert	  and	  Halligan	  argue	  that	  while	  performance	  management	  can	  provide	  the	  basis	  for	  policy	  improvement	  and	  comprehensive	  approaches	  in	  collaborative	  arrangements	  there	  is	  a	  threat	  that	  without	   appropriate	   system	   design	   there	   is	   an	   ever	   present	   risk	   of	   policy	   failure.	  Agranoff	  and	  Radin	  (2015;	  13)	  argue	  that	  the	  US	  federal	  government’s	  primacy	  over	  the	   past	   20	   years	   has	   reduced	   the	   ability	   of	   state	   and	   local	   governments	   to	  determine	   programme	   goals,	   specify	   measures	   and	   determine	   appropriate	  information	   sources	   to	   assess	   implementation.	   	   In	   Australia	   poor	   consultation	   by	  central	  agencies	  in	  the	  negotiation	  of	  outputs	  and	  performance	  measures	  resulted	  in	  a	   lack	   of	   commitment	   within	   line	   agencies	   to	   the	   national	   education	   reform	  objectives	  (Jones	  and	  Bouckaert	  2015).	  	  A	  lack	  of	  consistency	  in	  performance	  across	  the	  jurisdictions	  is	  attributed	  to	  this	  failure	  in	  the	  initial	  stages.	  	  	  
	  
Performance	  Governance	  in	  Performance	  Federalism	  	  This	  paper	  now	  proposes	   the	  new	  perspective	  of	   ‘performance	   federalism’,	  where	  performance	  is	  a	  managerial	  mechanism	  for	  policy	  and	  management	  change	  that	  is	  administrative	  in	  its	  mode	  of	  operation,	  and	  concerned	  with	  effective,	  rational	  use	  of	  resources,	  agreed	  policy	  goals	  and	  objectives.	  	  This	  ideal	  type	  remains	  a	  theoretical	  construct	   as	   Bouckaert	   and	   Halligan	   are	   unaware	   of	   any	   country	   that	   can	   claim	  location	   in	   this	   category.	   	  They	  also	   suggest	   their	  observations	  of	   current	  practice	  reveal	  fragments	  and	  indicators	  of	  key	  elements	  of	  what	  they	  regard	  as	  Performance	  Governance	  as	  a	  method	  of	  managing	  performance.	   	  Governance	   in	   this	   ideal	   type	  regards	  governments	  as	  more	  responsive	  to	  external	  preferences	  and	  incorporation	  interactions	   with	   citizens	   and	   civil	   society.	   	   Performance	   parameters	   are	   more	  national	  and	  societal	  with	  an	  outcome	  agenda	  that	  links	  specific	  indicators	  to	  macro	  endeavours	   and	   objectives	   (Bouckaert	   and	   Halligan	   2008;	   182).	   	   Of	   particular	  relevance	  to	  federal	  systems	  is	  the	  depth	  of	  performance	  present	  in	  this	  ideal	  type.	  	  Spanning	   the	  micro,	   meso	   and	  macro	   Performance	   Governance	   reveals	   a	   form	   of	  multilevel	   governance	   that	   includes	   single	   organisations,	   their	   networks	   across	  jurisdictional	   boundaries,	   policy	   networks	   and	   consolidated	   government	   wide	   or	  societal	  scopes	  (Bouckaert	  and	  Halligan	  2008;	  187).	  	  	  The	   aspirational	   performance	   governance	   forms	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   administrative	  arrangements	   for	   Performance	   Federalism.	   	   Performance	   Governance	   suggests	  greater	  complexity,	   less	  control	  by	  governments	  and	   tends	   to	  be	  grounded	   in	   four	  components.	  	  First	  organisational	  relationships	  within	  and	  beyond	  the	  public	  sector	  cover	  a	  range	  of	  collaborations	  governed	  by	  performance.	  	  Second,	  participation	  and	  citizen	   engagement	   activities	   support	   performance	   feedback.	   	   Third,	   there	   is	  integration	  of	  performance	  across	  several	  levels	  representing	  social	  impact	  and	  well	  being	   indicators.	   	   Finally,	   social	   impacts	   as	   demonstrated	   by	   performance	   control	  implementation	  and	  service	  delivery.	  	  	  
	   17	  
At	   the	   macro	   level	   an	   interactive	   approach	   requires	   a	   focus	   on	   citizen	   centric	  approaches	   and	   service	   delivery.	   	   They	   are	   participatory	   so	   there	   are	   bottom	   up	  conceptions	   that,	   contrary	   to	   conventional	   centralised	   approaches,	   provide	  opportunities	  to	  engage	  citizens	  in	  performance	  measurement	  and	  re-­‐evaluation	  of	  performance	   in	   a	   democratic	   process.	   	   A	   partnership	   based	   approach	   will	   see	  governments	  working	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  private	  and	  not	  for	  profit	  sector	  in	  the	  delivery	   of	   government	   services	   and	   in	   some	   instances	   undertaking	   the	   work	  normally	   provided	   by	   governments.	   	   At	   the	   macro	   level	   the	   challenge	   for	   the	  national	   government	   is	   to	   define	  minimal	   and	   common	   performance	   benchmarks	  horizontally	  with	  policy	  instruments	  for	  enforcement	  based	  on	  legal	  competencies.	  	  Examples	   of	   these	   approaches	   include	   the	   Australian	   Government’s	   Community	  Housing	   Infrastructure	   Programme	   where	   the	   national	   government	   provides	   the	  funds,	  with	  performance	  conditions	  in	  a	  legal	  framework,	  to	  state	  governments	  who	  then	  contract	  private	  and	  not	  for	  profit	  agencies	  as	  well	  as	  community	  organisations	  to	   construct	   new	   homes	   for	   Indigenous	   communities	   in	   remote	   areas.	  	  Representatives	  of	  these	  communities	  are	  part	  of	  a	  national	  regulatory	  system	  that	  monitors	   the	   service	   standards	   and	   ensures	   compliance	   with	   outcome	   based	  performance	  standards	  (NRSCH	  2015).	  	  	  	  At	   the	  meso	   level	   subnational	   governments	   play	   a	   creative	   and	   proactive	   part	   in	  Performance	  Federalism’	  chiefly	  as	  service	  providers,	  with	  differentiation	  in	  needs,	  customer	  connectedness	  and	  variations	  in	  the	  delivery	  itself.	  	  They	  remain,	  though,	  subject	   to	   continuous	   performance	   scrutiny	   and	   oversight	   with	   the	   national	  government	   in	   a	   managerial	   role.	   	   For	   Bouckaert	   and	   Halligan	   Performance	  Governance	   covers	   a	   shift	   from	   governing	   of	   performance	   to	   governing	   for	  performance	  (Bouckaert	  and	  Halligan	  2008;	  184).	  	  Such	  initiatives	  are	  an	  element	  of	  subsidiarity	  based	  approaches	  examining	   issues	  of	  direct	   relevance	   to	   citizens.	   	   In	  the	   delivery	   of	   government	   services	   it	   might	   appear	   that	   the	   requirements	   of	  Performance	  Governance	   suggest	   it	   is	  more	  appropriate	   for	  a	   level	  of	   government	  closer	  to	  the	  point	  of	  delivery	  (Bouckaert	  and	  Halligan	  2008;	  190).	  	  The	  complexity	  of	   service	   delivery	   in	   federal	   systems	   however	   often	   requires	   an	   integrated	  approach	   represented	   by	   joined	   up	   initiative	   across	   the	   levels.	   	   The	   ‘soul’	   of	  performance	  federalism	  would	  encompass	  elements	  such	  as	  equal	  rights	  of	  citizens	  by	  adjusting	  service	  delivery	  to	  their	  specific	  needs;	  public	  service	  equalization;	  and	  shared	   outcome	   based	   policies	   linked	   to	   accepted	   and	   different	   networks	   and	  governance	   systems	   guaranteeing	   these	   outcomes.	   	   Examples	   include	   community	  consultation	   processes	   in	   regional	   planning	   proposals.	   	   The	   idea	   is	   that	   policy	  makers	  use	  governance	  strategies	  to	  ensure	  decisions	  take	  into	  account	  the	  range	  of	  needs	   and	   perspectives	   of	   a	   diverse	   public	   in	   consultation	   and	   decision	   making	  activities	   (Cameron	   and	   Smith	   2005).	   	   Such	   inclusionary	   practices	   provide	  opportunities	   for	  policy	   innovation	   in	   the	  provision	  of	   infrastructure,	  housing	  and	  transportation.	   	  The	  breadth	  of	   these	  policy	  areas	   requires	  horizontal	  and	  vertical	  collaboration	   both	   with	   other	   levels	   of	   government	   and	   between	   agencies.	  	  Performance	   Governance	   regards	   citizens	   as	   crucial	   in	   the	   organisation	   of	   public	  services	  and	  service	  delivery.	  	  In	  this	  Weberian	  ideal	  type,	  they	  need	  to	  be	  involved	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in	   the	   whole	   policy	   cycle	   from	   co-­‐designing,	   co-­‐deciding,	   co-­‐producing	   to	   co-­‐evaluating	  public	  services	  (Pollitt	  et	  al.	  2006).	  	  	  	  At	  the	  micro	   level	  citizen	  empowerment	  requires	  quality	  performance	  information	  that	   is	   pitched	   at	   society	   to	   generate	   participation	   and	   trust.	   	   Mechanisms	   to	  integrate,	  align	  and	  frame	  participation	  of	  citizens	  raise	  the	  question	  of	  proximity	  to	  communities.	   	   Attempts	   at	   the	   macro	   and	   meso	   level	   to	   establish	   network	  governance	   flow	   into	   the	  micro	   level	  where	   there	  needs	   to	  be	  a	   response	   to	  more	  innovative	   methods	   of	   service	   delivery.	   	   Performance	   Governance	   would	   see	   top	  down	   and	   bottom	   up	   approaches	   establish	   greater	   flexibility	   emerging	   from	  participatory	   decision	   making.	   	   Participation	   and	   cooperation	   must	   be	   seen	   by	  citizens	  to	  be	  worthwhile.	  	  For	  people	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  meaningful	  way	  they	  need	  to	   feel	   government	   authorities	   use	   information	   acquired	   through	   consultative	  procedures,	   to	   serve	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   community.	   	   Cremer	   and	   Tyler	   (2007)	  propose	   ‘meaningful	   procedural	   fairness’	   as	   a	   variable	   that	   positively	   affects	  cooperation.	  	  We	  argue	  that	  such	  procedural	  fairness	  also	  needs	  to	  be	  ‘perceived’	  by	  citizens	   as	   meaningful,	   thereby	   increasing	   trust	   and	   willingness	   to	   be	   involved.	  	  Double	  loop	  learning	  emerges	  because	  innovation	  is	  a	  result	  of	  performance	  based	  governance.	  	  Measuring	  innovations	  is	  therefore	  also	  measuring	  the	  performance	  of	  its	  governance	  (Boyne	  et	  al.	  2002).	   	  Because	  of	  the	  complexities	  involved,	  dialogue	  that	   facilitates	   participation	   becomes	   one	   vehicle	   to	   help	   guarantee	   success	   on	  issues	  of	   performance	   and	  accountability	   (Bouckaert	   and	  Halligan	  2008;	  193).	   	  At	  the	   micro	   level	   a	   number	   of	   initiatives	   in	   US	   cities	   have	   seen	   attempts	   by	  governments	   to	   make	   budgets	   more	   open,	   accountable	   and	   participatory.	   	   One	  example	   is	   the	   Participatory	   Budgeting	   initiative	   established	   in	   New	   York	   City	   in	  2011.	  	  Council	  members	  discuss	  with	  members	  of	  the	  community	  in	  their	  boroughs	  to	  choose	  how	  to	  spend	  roughly	  $1	  million	  in	  capital	  discretionary	  funding	  on	  things	  like	   computers	   for	   schools,	   cameras	   in	   public	   housing,	   or	   parks	   improvements.	   In	  2014	   the	   Council	   allocated	   over	   $25	  million	   to	   these	   projects	   (Meriwether	   2014).	  	  The	   ‘pro	  poor	  public	  private	  partnerships’	  (5p’s)	  approach	  adopted	  in	  the	  delivery	  of	   energy	   to	   remote	   communities	   in	   India	   has	   seen	   the	   involvement	   of	   the	  community	  as	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  programme	  (Chaurey	  et	  al.	  2012).	  	  	  
	  	  
Application	  for	  researchers	  	  	  The	   application	   of	   this	   model	   in	   future	   research	   will	   enable	   the	   analysis	   of	  performance	  management	  initiatives	  designed	  to	  reform	  the	  delivery	  of	  government	  services	  in	  federal	  systems.	  Performance	  management	  has	  to	  be	  improved	  and	  new	  knowledge	   can	   contribute	   to	   it.	   A	   richer	   understanding	   will	   be	   found,	   however,	  when	  Bouckaert	  and	  Pollitt’s	  reform	  framework	  is	  used	  as	  a	   lens	  for	  analysing	  the	  realities	  of	  case	  studies.	  Recent	  reforms	  have	  generally	  aimed	  to	  bring	  about	  better	  coordination	  and	  cooperation	  among	   levels	  of	   government	  as	  a	  means	   to	  enhance	  performance	  in	  service	  delivery	  (Erk	  and	  Swenden,	  2010).	  	  The	  federalism	  literature	  emphasises	   the	   importance	  of	  contextual	   factors	  when	  analysing	  reform	  measures	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in	   any	   given	   system	   (Erk,	   2010;	   Burgess,	   2006).	   	   Pollitt	   and	   Bouckaert	   (2011)	  identify	  socio	  economic	  forces,	  the	  political	  system	  and	  the	  administrative	  system	  as	  the	   critical	   contextual	   factors	   to	   consider	   for	   reforms	   based	   on	   performance	  management.	   	  At	   the	  centre	  of	   these	  contextual	   factors	  Pollitt	  and	  Bouckaert	  place	  elite	  decision-­‐making	  (see	  Figure	  2).	  	  	  	  
Figure	  2.	  Public	  Management	  Reform	  Framework	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government	   responsibility	   and	   potential	   legal	   and	   contractual	   arrangements	  between	  governments.	   	   Federal	   systems	   exist	   in	  many	   countries	  where	   important	  reforms	  have	  taken	  place	  over	  the	  last	  three	  decades	  and	  the	  federalism	  dimension	  needs	  to	  be	  added	  to	  the	  existing	  analytical	  frameworks.	  Political	  factors	  play	  a	  role	  in	  parliamentary	   systems	  with	   strong	  political	  parties	   ideological	  positions	  and	  or	  populist	  ideas	  that	  influence	  the	  agenda	  for	  reform.	  	  Policy	  commitments	  of	  political	  parties,	   outlined	   in	   election	   platforms,	   are	   critical	   contextual	   factors	   that	   provide	  evidence	  of	  ideas	  influencing	  centralisation	  and	  decentralisation,	  ideas	  about	  public	  sector	   management,	   and	   responses	   to	   citizens’	   demands	   for	   improved	   service	  delivery.	  	  Gibson	  (2004)	  contends	  the	  incentives	  provided	  to	  political	  actors	  through	  the	   party	   system	   can	   exert	   centralising	   or	   decentralising	   influences	   in	   federal	  systems.	   	  Whether	   institutional	  arrangements	  empower	  sub	  national	  governments	  can	  depend	  on	  the	  political	  linkages	  or	  partisan	  alignments	  at	  the	  national	  and	  sub	  national	  level	  (Gibson	  2004)	  and	  of	  habits	  of	  executive	  federalism.	  	  	  Administrative	  culture	  within	  civil	  service	  agencies	  can	  impact	  on	  the	  application	  of	  performance	   management	   particularly	   when	   reforms	   require	   joint	   action	   and	  cooperation	  between	   agencies	   at	   each	   level	   of	   government.	   	  Management	   reforms	  oblige	   staff	   to	   relinquish	  old	  ways	   and	   learn	  new.	   	  Administrative	   systems	   can	  be	  difficult	   to	   change	   in	   more	   than	   incremental	   ways.	   	   Organisational	   culture	  determines	   administrative	   systems	   and	   the	   implementation	   of	   human	   resource	  management	  policies	  and	  processes.	   	  Resistance	  to	  shifting	  the	  status	  quo	   in	  these	  systems	  can	  act	  as	  constraints	  on	  reform.	  	  Since	  the	  1980s	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  ‘service	  state’	   in	  OECD	  countries	  and	   the	  corresponding	  expansion	  of	  modes	  of	  networked	  governance	   arrangements	   has	   added	   complexity	   to	   the	   administration	   of	   service	  delivery	   (Wanna	  et	   al,	   2010,	   32).	   	   The	   implementation	  phase	  of	   reform	   initiatives	  often	   reveals	   the	  difficulty	  of	  moving	   from	   ideas	   to	  practice	  and	  can	   contribute	   to	  departure	   from	   original	   objectives.	   	   The	   identification	   of	   effective	   methods	   of	  evaluation	   and	   review	   are	   becoming	   increasingly	   critical	   for	   feedback	   in	   the	  challenging	   context	   of	   networked	   service	   delivery	   arrangements	   particularly	   in	  terms	  of	   transparency	  and	  accountability	  (Woodland	  et	  al,	  2012:	  Appleton-­‐Dyer	  et	  al,	  2012).	  	  	  Elite	   decision	   making	   lies	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   all	   contextual	   factors	   (Pollitt	   and	  Bouckaert	   2011).	   	   Political	   and	   administrative	   elites	   focus	   on	   the	   desirable	   and	  feasible	   reforms.	   	   Public	   management	   reforms	   tend	   to	   emerge	   from	   the	   upper	  echelons	  of	  government	   thereby	  allowing	  a	   ‘measure	  of	  choice’	   in	   the	   instruments	  and	   techniques	   preferred.	   	   An	   executive	   driven	   reform	   process	   suits	   decision-­‐making	  processes	  in	  parliamentary	  systems	  centred	  on	  cabinet	  ministers	  and	  their	  executives.	  	  Pollitt	  and	  Bouckaert	  warn	  that	  in	  reality	  these	  objectives	  will	  often	  be	  vulnerable	   to	   ‘cognitive	   limitations,	   cross	   cutting	   actions,	   politico-­‐administrative	  road-­‐blocks	   and	   unforeseen	   developments’	   (Pollitt	   and	   Bouckaert,	   2011,	   34).	   	   In	  federal	  systems	  the	  practice	  of	  sharing	  power	  is	  more	  important	  than	  the	  division	  of	  power	   and	   governance	   is	   characterised	   by	   extensive	   intergovernmental	   relations	  featuring	   complex	   cooperative,	   collaborative	   conciliatory,	   cooptive	   and	   sometimes	  coercive,	  conniving,	  and	  conflictive	  methods	  (Kincaid	  2011).	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  Applying	   this	   contextual	   lens	   in	   the	   application	   of	   this	   model	   to	   the	   analysis	   of	  federal	  systems	  will	  result	   in	  a	  rich	  assessment	  of	  attempts	  to	  reform	  government.	  The	  model	  will	  demonstrate	  the	  depth	  of	  reforms;	  these	  contextual	  applications	  will	  work	  to	  explain	  variations	  in	  both	  their	  depth,	  and	  more	  fundamentally	  against	  the	  span	   of	   performance	   management.	   How	   measures	   are	   made,	   results	   are	  incorporated	   and	   findings	   used	   are	   all	   heavily	   impacted	   by	   these	   contextual	  considerations.	  Attention	  to	  their	  realities	  across	  multiple	  federal	  case	  studies	  using	  this	   model	   of	   performance	   analysis	   will	   provide	   a	   comprehensive	   understanding	  assessment	  of	  performance	  management	  in	  federal	  systems.	  	  The	  model’s	  usefulness	  applies	  to	  reform	  trajectories	  where	  evolving	  systems	  of	  federalism	  require	  evolving	  systems	   to	   manage	   performance,	   or	   vice	   versa;	   it	   allows	   differentiation	   in	  performance	  driven	   reforms	   for	  example	  privatization,	  partnerships,	   and	  different	  levels	   of	   subsidiarity.	   	   To	   test	   the	   “map”	   proposed	   in	   this	   paper,	   further	   research	  could	  facilitate	  testing	  of	  why	  implementation	  is	  functioning	  successfully	  and	  where	  different	   experiences	   are	   located	   within	   the	   model.	   	   The	   model	   can	   facilitate	  research	   questions	   like	   ‘is	   it	   possible	   for	   performance	  management	   to	   take	   place	  within	   competitive	   federalism’	   and	   ‘could	   we	   have	   examples	   of	   performance	  governance	   in	   fiscal	   federalism’.	   	   Consequently,	   applying	   our	   model	   in	   future	  research	   of	   this	   nature	   will	   contribute	   significantly	   to	   both	   federalism	   and	  performance	  management	  literature.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  	  In	   this	   paper,	   we	   have	   proposed	   a	   model	   for	   analysing	   performance	   initiatives	  designed	   to	   reform	   the	   delivery	   of	   government	   services	   in	   federal	   systems.	   	   We	  developed	   “ideal	   types”	   and	   gave	   numerous	   examples	   of	   the	   different	   elements.	  	  Performance	  governance	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  “remaining	  “	  element	  of	  the	  new	  public	  management	  wave	   that	  has	   swept	   governments	  over	   the	   last	  decades	   and	   left	   the	  idea	   that	   reforms	   have	   to	   be	   pursued.	   	   Strategic	   planning	   and	   the	   performance	  management	   that	   follows	   it	   are	   essential	   elements	   in	   efforts	   to	   improve	   the	  functioning	   of	   governments	   in	   austerity	   periods	   as	   well	   as	   in	   easier	   times.	   	   Our	  research	   suggests	   that	   institutional	   factors	   help	   to	   understand	   how	   and	   when	  performance	  can	  be	  useful	  to	  improve	  the	  functioning	  of	  governments.	  	  One	  of	  these	  institutional	   elements	   in	   countries	   where	   reforms	   have	   often	   been	   important	   is	  federalism.	   	  There	   are	   various	   types	  of	   federalism	  and	  performance	   regimes	  vary.	  	  This	   said,	   the	   performance	   of	   government	   can	   still	   be	   improved	   and	   this	   paper	  offers	   suggestions	   how	   to	   do	   so.	   Technological	   and	   information	   capacities	   have	  vastly	  improved	  and	  allow	  for	  better	  monitoring	  across	  government	  levels	  in	  federal	  systems.	   	   Moreover,	   citizen	   pressure	   for	   seamless	   government	   has	   increased	   and	  national	  and	  subnational	  governments	  have	  to	  better	  integrate	  service	  delivery	  and	  performance	  measurement.	   	  As	  we	  suggested,	  national	   competitiveness	  also	   relies	  on	   improving	  performance.	   	   Further	   research	   is	  needed	   in	  various	  policy	   fields	   to	  evaluate	  the	  evolution	  toward	  performance	  federalism	  and	  needed	  reforms.	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